

GLOBAL ACADEMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE

COLOMBO, SRI LANKA



GARI International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research

ISSN 2659-2193

Volume: 06 | Issue: 01

On 31st March 2020

<http://www.research.lk>

Author: Scofield Yoni Awiti Muliru

University of Nairobi, Kenya

GARI Publisher | Peace and Conflict Management | Volume: 06 | Issue: 01

Article ID: IN/GARI/ICPCM/2020/116 | Pages: 97-112 (15)

ISSN 2659-2193 | ISBN 978-955-7153-00-1

Edit: GARI Editorial Team | Received: 20.02.2020 | Publish: 31.03.2020

ADOPTING A GENERALIZABLE INDEX FOR P/CVE IMPACT EVALUATIONS

Scofield Yoni Awiti Muliru

Scofield Associates & PhD Student, University of Nairobi, Kenya

director@scofieldassociates.co.ke

ABSTRACT

With the increasing role of preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) interventions in development and security initiatives, practitioners seek rigorous methods for evaluating the effectiveness of such interventions. However, such techniques remain limited because of the nascent and diverse nature of the field. Significant analytic challenges in proving causality include contextual variations in indicator development and barriers to data collection. Evaluations of interventions also grapple with the concept of “enough-time-for-change”; yet, no consensus has emerged on how much time is needed before interventions can produce its desired impact. While many studies use variables on attitudes, perceptions, behaviours, or inter-personal relationships in isolation, compiling these variables into an index better illuminates causal linkages between them and violent extremism. It also emphasises communities’ resilience capacities as a robust metric for assessing P/CVE impact in different contexts. Moreover, having a minimum accepted timeline to track influence from radicalisation, or change in resilience abilities, clarifies a roadmap for project evaluation. This paper borrows from the formulae developed for the Isiolo PVE index, making the case that violent extremism in communities is dependent on three indicators: Radicalisation, Resilience Capacities and the Cost of Action. To justify the use of contextual and shared variables as indicators for measuring P/CVE impact, the paper includes; 1) a literature review of sampled

measurement tools for VE, 2) successful P/CVE programs, and 3) the role of religious ideology in the Horn of Africa. This paper thus provides generalizable indicators and a minimum time for change, as standards for P/CVE impact evaluations.

Keywords: Variables (Attitudes, Behaviours, Relationships), Scales (Resilience, Radicalisation, Cost of Action) & Minimum Time for Impact

INTRODUCTION

The state of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa is uncertain. The broader Horn of Africa countries are learning and have developed a myriad of plans and strategies of responding to violent extremism. Though the hard approach that includes counter-terrorism remain applicable in various occasions, a system-wide approach that incorporates the whole society is undergoing full adoption. This preventative approach has resulted in strategies that provide thematic areas for engagement and theories of change that respond to the ever-changing phenomena.

Countries like Somalia and Kenya (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) have developed national strategies for preventing violent extremism, and other countries in the region are following the process. The Horn of Africa is also home to the Djibouti Centre housed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); who have developed a regional strategy to prevent

violent extremism (Maalim & Nyambura, 2018). The strategy harmonises all the activities to prevent violent extremism at the regional level; with more concentration on migration and movement.

Even with the myriad of interventions and the growing policy directives, there is no clarity on a harmonised status of engagement on "prevent" or "progress" processes on P/CVE. Most of the research work lack statistical data to provide inferential analysis that is generalizable beyond the given micro-context. To date, numerous successes cannot be accounted for cumulatively. The successes are program-specific and are void of a longitudinal advantage beyond the project. The situation is complicated further with the assumptions from a limited series of attack at a timeframe on an annual comparison; as a means of mentioning success or failure over a period. P/CVE investment options are, therefore made based on what works at the program level, without closely attending to the impact from program activities on the broader communities and the capacities for sustainability (Gielen, 2017). To put it bluntly, the Horn of Africa governments and practitioners cannot answer the question of "Where are we" in P/CVE. Though suggestions have moved from "What works?" to "What works where and how?" (Gielen, 2017), expanding this knowledge to apply to a broader context would be beneficial for future P/CVE interventions.

This paper borrows from the formulae developed for the Isiolo P/CVE index in Kenya. In this research, the author argues that violent extremism in communities is dependent on three indicators: Radicalisation, Resilience Capacities and the Cost of Action. This paper confirms that the same can be applied to a broader section of the Horn of Africa. It will briefly explore the current state of P/CVE programming and the state of violent

extremism in the Horn of Africa. It will review the tools available for terrorism risk assessment to highlight some of the lessons and challenges of utilising the tools. It will evidence the presence of strategies developed to account for a systems approach without a substantive process of measuring progress over time. The paper proposes the utilisation of an index to account for the fluidity of the subject matter.

Available tools for Assessment and Measurement

The development of an evidence-based and empirically valid risk assessment tool not only aids resource prioritisation but supports attempts to manage a variety of hazards (Roberts and Horgan, 2008). The violent extremist profile is improbable for discovery but there are general indicators and behavioural patterns that act as markers for individuals planning to commit an act of violence (Cook et al., 2014). The same can also be applied to identify indicators of success from P/CVE programming.

There are a series of measures globally to track the progress and effectiveness of violent extremism (VE) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) activities. Most of the techniques created to measure the impact of VE tracking efforts are not easily generalizable (Pressman & Flockton, 2012), as they represent specific contexts and regions around the world. In March 2017, the Department of Homeland Security conducted a study to understand the assessment tools for radicalisation into violent extremism. (RTI, 2017). As documented by the authors, a risk factor identifies a characteristic affecting the probability, while an indicator is a marker of affliction (Smith, 2016). The report also supported the thesis that not every individual who exhibits one or more potential risks associated with an outcome is necessarily engaging in or experiencing radicalisation to violent extremism. While

these tools do not measure the progress and impact of P/CVE programs, they provide recommendations for interventions based on the results. Specific analysis of individual tools provides some insights for risk to indicator transition that is crucial for a P/CVE index.

To start, the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) is one of the tools developed to measure risk assessment for violent extremism. This tool seeks to determine valid risk factors for violent extremism. The tool consists of 28 items categorised into five sections including; Attitudes, Context, History, Demographics and Protective Items (Roberts and Horgan, 2008). Over time, the study of radicalisation emphasised the role played by the environment, which was lacking for this tool. This resulted in the revision to VERA 2 released in 2010. This version include in twenty-five risk factors and six protective factors (Pressman & Flockton, 2010). The second iteration of the tool remains an individualised assessment approach that avoids the membership, behaviour, and other factors in groups; likely to play a deciding role for individual's into violent extremism (Cook et al., 2013; Pynchon & Borum, 1999).

Another tool is the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG) that is focused on the individual, social support and the influence of groups over the individual. In totality, twenty-one factors are included in the tool, but its development sample is only represented by convicted extremists initially studied. The factors are distributed to cover the beliefs, motivations, intent, and capability, as risk factors (Ajzen and Fishbein's, 2005).

Radar is another tool that is consistently use to provide observable steps in the process of radicalisation and recruitment. It consists of a screening assessment and an in-depth assessment. The screening assessment contains fifteen indicators categorised under ideology, social relations, and action orientation. The tool

focuses on high-risk individuals to be included in deradicalisation programs rather than the prediction of low level violent actions (Guikema, 2012).

Terrorism radicalisation assessment protocol (TRAP), is another tool that assesses the warning behaviours and distal characteristics, preceding targeted and non-random violence. The tool argues that identifying behavioural patterns as they relate to the timeframe of an attack, the law enforcement and mental health professionals can determine the appropriate level of monitoring and risk awareness required (Meloy, & Gill, 2016). From the review of available tools, the field of violent extremism research has not yet adequately identified and validated an empirical list of protective factors that can prevent the engagement in extremist violence (Davies, 2013, Garrick, 2002). Additionally, existing tools include errors from human judgement, the validity issues, suboptimal weighting of risk factors, and the inability to correctly factor the low occurrence of violent behaviours into the assessment (Scurich 2016; Gill, 2016). For instance, The VERA, protocol assess risks related to terrorism and violent extremism, but remains rigid to multidimensional nature of the problem (Netherlands Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 2019; Pressman & Flockton, 2012).

While the tools developed a focus on assessing the risks associated with violent extremism, there are recommendations for measurement processes to account for inferential data (Udéh, 2002). Some of these include experimental and quasi-experiments to serve well during the analysis of material and evaluation of programs that respond to violent extremism (Gielen, 2017). However, experimental models do not include empirical evidence linking to the intended effects resulting from the complexity of human behaviour and variable induced actions to their environments (Braddock,

2020). It is not to say that they have not been used before, as there are studies that document quasi-experimental utilisation (Feddes et al., 2015). The Switching-Replication Design as suggested in the quasi-experimental processed, serve as the better option in extant counter-radicalisation practices and deradicalisation programs, given the demand for empirical data supporting (or refuting) the effectiveness of programs' practices (Braddock, 2020).

Similar to the risk factors identified in the tools mentioned above, indicators of measurement are used to explain overall outcomes in communities. The thesis for the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) revolves around the attacks and the impact on GDP. Based on these variables, GTI argues the rise or reduction of terrorism based on the scale. However, though the Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economic Peace, 2018), serves as a critical tool to provide a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns, it has been criticised for using variables that cannot be empirically measured or linked to interventions. Scholars agree that protective factors or otherwise termed resilience capacities play a critical role in the pathway to violent extremism (Horgan, 2009; Jacobsen, 2010 and Hoffman, 2006). Yet and as an example, resilience capacities in communities is also lacking in the analysis. The dynamic nature of every region in the world calls for the creation of a unique measurement tool to be able to measure change effectively. There are lessons learnt from existing tools. The indicators from the tools provide risk factors; as a starting point for the transition to measuring P/CVE by highlighting a common and shared understanding of the signs to look out for before and after. These tools act as a depiction of problems to be solved rather than a rendering of prediction (Borum, 2015). For instance, the tools highlight the individual

characteristics of would-be terrorist; by analysing certain risks, while including protective factors to deter individuals from engaging in violent extremism (Aldrich, 2014). It is also worth noting that the resilience capacities are dynamic and evolve depending on individual belief or the influence from interventions.

The formulation of P/CVE interventions has protective factors in mind, but their effectiveness depend on their interpretation. As an example, if specific groups and communities negatively and disproportionately feel targeted by any P/CVE strategy, the influence to the community may be negative. Globally, governments have followed mechanisms that allow for the reduction of vulnerabilities into violent extremism through concentrating on protective factors; otherwise categorised as "prevent." These factors are applied to the community; indicating their critical role, as they acts as an early warning system (Briggs, 2010), and form part of the protective factors or resilience capacities that can safeguard young people from violent extremism. Communities are also spaces where the real and perceived grievances of young people can be addressed.

The evaluation of P/CVE programs becomes challenging due to the multiplicity of definitions and frameworks used to inform the policies and programs at all the levels. This challenge is exacerbated by the void coming from limited inferential data of individual behaviour to the broader population. Additionally, though the target population for P/CVE interventions as at-risk individuals, the assumptions allocated to the outcomes is placed on attitudes and behaviour changes that influence the community or the environment. It is for this reason that most of the P/CVE interventions allow for the target population to receive guidance from "role models" in their environments. However,

lack of simple pathways to violent extremism indicates not only complexity in the selection of the attributes but also in the relationship between the attributed. Violent extremism view from the path of radicalisation is categorised to include an ideology, behavioural conditioning and an environment that facilitates the uptake.

The challenges associated with 'context specificity' in CVE evaluation can be addressed by an measurement tool that incorporates a systems approach to cover the greater context. An index provides a scale that allows for the inclusion of the core factors that affect an issue while remaining aware of the contextual. The argument made by the such a tool can provide a relational engagement that responds to radicalisation, resilience and the cost of action. A measurement tool of this kind should also be dynamic to allow for the changing nature of variable importance in the environment. An index is therefore best suited to account for the diverse attributes, as it uses a realist view with the premise that each evaluation study can be valuable in terms of analysing of relevant contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes (Pawson, & Tilley, 1997). By using a realist view, the P/CVE- Index creates a middle-range theory to measure progress over time. It incorporates three components that do not act linearly and are highly dependent on the context in which they take place.

The P/CVE-Index can review a broad range of programming that collectively contributes to P/CVE activities through a multidimensional evaluation. The development of an index outlines the variable ratios that provide inferential statistical data for CVE impact in communities. This data can be utilised at the first level of the switching-replication design; a quasi-experimental design preferred for CVE evaluations. The P/CVE index can provide indicators for longitudinal baseline data to compare changes from interventions based on

specific indicators and activities implemented over time.

The index can also provide an opportunity for illuminating a pathway towards the predictive validity, concurrent validity, and discriminant validity based on the dimensions proposed (Davies, 2013). As evidenced in the pilot research in Isiolo-Kenya, it anchors and supports the radicalisation vs resilience thesis while making a case on the impact of investment when countering violent extremism. The P/CVE-Index categorises the indicators into three dimensions to anchor the change measurement over some time.

Radicalisation Dimension

The study of terrorism distinguishes a three-way analysis of radicalisation that include individuals motives and beliefs, group-level decision making and strategy, and the broader political and social context (Crenshaw, 1981). In understanding radicalisation, the work of Macauley and Maselenko is crucial as they document eleven research works that talk about pathways and indicators of radicalisation into violent extremism. These include; The staircase to terrorism, (Moghaddam, 2005) three ideas in the progression to terrorist action, (Horgan, 2005) a four-stage model of radicalisation, (Wiktorowicz, 2005) New York Police Department four-stage process, (Silber and Bhatt, 2007) and radicalisation as terror management (Pyszczynski, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2009) among others. Additionally, social movement analysis has indicators explaining radicalisation and the pathways to violent extremism (della Porta, 2013). From all the scholarly work, it is clear that becoming a terrorist is not a natural or linear progression from being a radical (Kundnani, 2012). Those who turned to violence follow a path of radicalisation that is characterised by a culture of violence, in-group peer

pressure, and an internal code of honour where violence can be a route to accruing status. Additionally, radicalisation is separated as that of opinion and that of action (Schuurman, & Taylor, 2018). What is shared from the studies is the fact that religious ideology as the anchoring factor is usually rare, and political radicalisation is visibly evident (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009).

Radicalisation to violence is an emergent property of escalating conflict, especially when nonviolent activism is suppressed or failing. Though there is little to no overlap in risk factors for collective violence, and terrorism, these indicators can be used to evaluate radicalisation into violent extremism in communities. The variables include identities, ideology, affiliations, grievances, and moral emotions (Monahan, 2012; 2015). This is also supported by the significance quest pathway that highlights the fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, to have respect, need for esteem, achievement, meaning, competence (Kruglanski et al., 2014). From scholarly work, radicalisation indicators can be categorised under the vulnerabilities, the relational activities and ramifications. The vulnerability indicators look at weaknesses that communities may experience that could make them susceptible to radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism. These vulnerabilities may include; the level of inclusion and integration of a community to the greater society (Klausen, et al., 2015); the levels of development of the community when compared to others in the region; the question of victimisation and personal grievances of a community.

Frustration-Aggression/Pain-

Aggression has also been used to illustrate the individual grievance into a group or shared grievance (Dennen & Van der, 2005). In explaining the process of radicalisation from a personal grievance perspective, the journey that involves the movement from personal to political

through a shared problem determines the trajectory of radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalkenko, 2011). This journey also helps formulate the different classes and categories that can be used to share the grievance as a vulnerability and a conduit for action. Additionally, questions on the perception of safety, security and the level of criminal activities in a community, will be considered.

Relational activity indicators are interested in looking at the influence of political trends and factors in a specific in a community, region or context, and how it could lead to the radicalisation of a people. Participation in political action and other related activities can formulate pathways to radicalisation (Aningo, 2014). The influence of political action on the radicalisation of a people such as the participation of youths in political activity requires a microscopic review. Scholarly opinion on the matter has proven that political dissonance is best suited to explain the radicalisation process (Maikovich, 2005; Borum, 2012; Moghaddam, 2009). The lack of a platform to voice opinions, especially by youth, is noted to be a crucial factor in the process of radicalisation.

The ramification indicators provide insight into the perceived impacts of radicalisation and recruitment in the community. For instances the disappearances of youth in a community, extrajudicial killing, concepts of marginalisation, profiling and targeting. Additionally, recruiters always recruit from the connections they have as this process serves to strengthen the bond of trust within the organisation (Scofield Associates, 2018). Various research works have also mentioned, "block recruitment" (McCauley, & Moskalkenko, 2011) which is synonymous with peer recruitment process. Ramification indicators will also cover question on ideology precisely 'negative ideology' in the recruitment into violent extremist groups.

Resilience Dimension

Though P/CVE policy should address the grievances that lead individuals to radicalisation, there are three forms of strategies, based on a public health model (Harris-Hogan et al., 2015). Primarily prevention initiatives are designed to educate individuals about violent extremism and raise awareness that prevent the emergence of a breeding ground for the radicalisation of individuals. The secondary level classification consists of interventions to individuals with indicators of radicalisation as they engage in an extremist social network (Williams et al., 2016). Tertiary-level programmes work with those already considered as extremist to disengage from a violent extremist network and to desist from violent behaviour. Most of the prevention programs have an assumption anchoring on improving the protective factors or the resilience capacities in the communities or specific context. Most PCVE models, therefore, recognise vulnerable audiences as individuals, sub-groups, that form part of the communities (Liht and Savage, 2013).

Individuals can be resilient to some risks but not to others, and the capacities are formed at an individual and social level, with the families being the most robust buffer for risk factors for violent extremism (Spalek, & Davies, 2012). The term resilience refers to common strategies that communities adapt to mitigate activities that make them vulnerable to violent extremism (Van Metre, 2016). It is the actualisation of existing collective capacities, such as a shared belief in the collective power to achieve desired results, to address a disruptive shock such as electoral conflict, clan conflict, or violent extremism (Isiolo County Action Plan, 2018). The processes of becoming a resilient community involve inherently reducing the potential

vulnerabilities or risk factors (Dina, 2013). It involves building true partnerships through social networks that lead to the creation of a healthy community identity that is needed to counter and prevent violent extremism (Van Metre, 2016). The creation of a resilience scale has put into consideration three essential thematic categorisation including; social capital, social bridging and the social linking.

Social capital indicators of resilience look at the nature of resources embedded in social networks, how they are accessed and their usage by communities (Nan, 2002). The different forms of social capital include family ties, relationships with neighbours and friends. It also includes shared experience or cultural norms. Social capital can have a group base, a network base or an institutional base. The higher the social capital in a community, the less likely persons from the community will be involved in terrorism and violent extremism activities. Social bonding/bridging indicators, on the other hand, are interested in understanding how attached individuals are to their conventional society. Studies show that individuals with strong and abiding attachments to a conventional society are less likely to deviate to criminal activity (Kempf, 1993). By understanding the level of social cohesion in a community, one can be able to judge their resilience capabilities. Social bonding allows for diverse groups to share and exchange innovations, information and ideas, thus build consensus among the groups representing diverse interests.

Accordingly, these bonds come in four interrelated forms, including; attachment which refers to the level of psychological affection one has for prosocial others and institutions. The commitment that provides importance to the social relationships that people value; involvement, which relates to the opportunity costs associated with how people spend their time; and finally, belief

that refers to the degree to which one adheres to the values associated with behaviours that conform to the law. These interrelated forms allow for diverse groups to share and exchange information, ideas and innovations, to build consensus with diverse interests. It widens social capital by increasing the “radius of trust” (Chriss, 2007). Unlike bonding, that includes a narrow “radius of trust,” bridging creates a democratic institutional structure with a broader political and economic development.

Finally, the resilience of a community can also be gauged based on its social links, which involves understanding the link between groups and positions of power & authority. This indicator is particularly crucial for socio-culturally disadvantaged or economically resource-poor communities. The more communities are linked to power and wealth, the greater the resource access and the likelihood of coping with adverse challenges such as terrorism and violent extremism (Wouter, 2012). Community-level adaptation or resilience is also dependent on social linking, or what Mignone and O'Neil refer to as “vertical capital” (Mignone, & O'Neil, 2005).

This is also referred to as “state-society relations” (He, & Tianguang, 2005), linking capital encompasses the vertical relationships that individuals and groups establish with those in positions of power and authority (Grossman, & Ungar, 2017). As Magis observes, the more communities link with sources of power, wealth and access to resources, the better situated they will be to take advantage of opportunities (Magis, 2010). They will also develop stronger networks and resources for coping with challenge and adversity (Wouter, 2011).

Cost of Action Dimension

The cost of action involves the efforts and inputs to preventing and countering violent extremism. The cost of action dimension involves evaluating the use of

hard power strategies implemented in communities to deal with the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism. It includes the deployment of security officers and the use of force to deal with suspected criminal activity. On the other hand, it also involves the use of soft power techniques by both state and non-state actors to build the capacity of the community to challenge radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism effectively. This dimension investigates material and non-material resources to prevent and counter violent extremism.

The time for change is also included in this dimension. Various studies show the time taken to influence behaviour, but there is no standardised timeline for change to affect communities (Middleton et al., 2016; Grohol, 2018). The index borrows from the journey to extremism study that showed the tipping point analogy to be between three to six months (UNDP, 2017). Change in communities also takes a similar timeline to evidence impact. This dimension, therefore, argues a timeline of up to one year for adequate representative data. The significant components of cost of action include Government responsibility, Government response and external response; reviewed over one-year period.

Isiolo CVE Index

Returning to the pilot work that applied the Index, Isiolo County in Kenya has in recently a recruitment hotspot by Violent Extremist groups. Forms of conflict and violence include intercommunal resource-based conflict; inter-county border conflicts; Ethno-political conflict and violent extremism. Drivers of conflict include weak legal frameworks to protect indigenous land rights; drought which leads to pastoral mobility; cultural factors in pastoral conflict; the proliferation of small arms; conservation; large infrastructure projects and lack of consultation and most recently political competition, since devolution.

Devolution in recent times has contributed to inter-ethnic competition and rivalry. The county is privileged to be a central node in the LAPSET mega infrastructural projects, which brings more complexity to the existing conflict system. As from late 2016, Isiolo County has featured in police press briefings and the media as a sleeper cell county for extremist activities associated with Al-Shabaab. The indicators selected considered structural conflict issues and have aligned these realities to other contextual needs of individuals in the community. It also accounted for the fluidity of the indicators and thus emphasised understanding the needs of a whole system rather than focusing on the traditional narrow view of CVE action from the radicalisation perspective. The frame assumed that increased reliance on resilience factors would bare positive responses to reduce recruitment, increase rehabilitation and reintegration in Kenyan society. The Index, therefore, follows a mid-range analysis that contextualises violent extremism within the context of Isiolo by looking at three key dimensions- the radicalisation dimension, the resilience dimension and the cost of action dimension. A conceptualised formula accounted for the level of countering violent extremism in a region. The formula is;

$$\text{P/CVE Index} = (\text{Radicalisation scale} * \text{Resilience scale}) / (\text{Cost of action scale})$$

The overall Index is determined by calculating a median from a Multi-Correspondence Analysis, emanating from the baseline data. The Index is based on a scale of one to ten. Median was used because it is not affected by the extreme value of the Index. The formula above is premised on the strong theoretical underpinnings and mathematical axioms.

From the study, Isiolo radicalisation scale was measured based on crucial

sentinel indicators. The study concluded that the radicalisation index in Isiolo county is at 7.46 out of the maximum 10 points. A high index of this nature would mean there is a higher threat to violent extremism and terrorism in a region. 81% of the citizens of the county noted recruitment to violent extremist organisations. The resilience index of Isiolo county is at 4.85 out of a 10-point scale. It is an average performance for Isiolo county, which means that it needs to enhance the resilience of its people against VE further. The presence of an active identity formation and association in the county has contributed the highest to the Index while the relationship with existing structures in the national government was the lowest contributor to the resilience index.

The cost of action scale is at 5.0 out of 10 for Isiolo County. It is a relatively average position on the scale. There is a need for further resources to be channelled to the county to prevent and counter violent extremism effectively. The study proposed areas of investments that resonate with the community and can be applied as interventions either as CVE Specific or P/CVE relevant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

P/CVE programs ideally respond to the needs in communities. Though scholarly work questions the individualised thinking around radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism activities, there are lessons to be learnt from this assessment. On the other hand, contextualisation of the environment that germinates the process from the individual to the group relation and association is crucial. When responding to the vulnerabilities and the risks associated with terrorism, individual programs and activities are not only expensive but also not very useful as they lack the generalisation processes for more

substantial impact, hence the placement of P/CVE in community contexts.

Community-led indicators can provide a clear understanding and a measure of progress from P/CVE activities. The argument made is that violent extremism and terrorism is dependent on the intersection between the ideologies (cognitive radicalisation) and the environment that allows for the movement (behavioural radicalisation), into terrorism. Its success, on the other hand, is dependent on the community's capacities to deter or allow for these environments to flourish (resilience capacities). Additionally, these environments require specific opportunities or inputs that contribute to vulnerabilities or capacities. (cost of action).

The inclusion of driver to violent extremism alludes to the fact that radicalisation is a risk that is quantifiable and measurable; from the place of action and impact out of the process. Therefore, it would be potentially less problematic to focus on cognitive structures and modes of thought in a 'content-neutral' way than starting from a point where certain ideological or religious beliefs made suspect. This model works within a given context to avoid possibilities of communities engaging in violent extremism. As an added area, most of the interventions desire to bolster the resilience capacities for most communities to ensure that interventions achieve long term impact.

Other methods have incorporated some level of scientific engagement to understand the impact of P/CVE. This paper does not critic the specific indicator-based analyses that often are transitioned into a hypothesis that is specific to the context and challenge. While these provide valuable insights to P/CVE evaluation and extended, view of the issues around VE would be beneficial for decision making rather than an indicator analysis.

When investigated in isolation, P/CVE attributes lack construct validity and the outcomes and often based on broad assumptions in the methodology to offered recommendation alluding activity-specific risk rather than a holistic and comprehensive view. Attribute formation focuses on an individual analysis of change rather than a society or communities attribute of change. The individual mapped out attributes fail to account for their placement in time and the context of operationalisation. The result is individuals who may be mapped out at a different stage with specific expectations, not committing an act of terrorism as anticipated.

CONCLUSION

Though the index provides lessons learnt from piloting the tool in Isiolo in Kenya, the dimensions and indicators require validation across the Horn of Africa for it to have authority. Unlike the challenges of validation associated with the risk assessment tools for violent extremism, the index provides a target population and a validation platform for use at regular intervals. Though the index does not belabour the definition of terms, it allows for the common terminology to support theory development anchored on dimensions that are the pivots of P/CVE programming in communities. This tool will contribute to not only evaluate the impact through analysis of the level of contribution from the intervention but also create relevant and applicable planning strategy for future intervention areas.

REFERENCE

- Abbasi, I., Khtwani, M. K., & Soomro, H. A., (2017), "A Review of Psycho-Social Theories of Terrorism," *Grassroots, Vol 51, No 11.*
- Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M., (2005), "The influence of attitudes on behaviour,"

- In D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The handbook of attitudes* (pp. 173-221). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Aldrich, D., (2014), "First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 26, No 3, Pp. 523-546.
- Aningo, P., (2014), "Kenya Should go Back to the Drawing Board to Find Realistic Solutions to the Threat of Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism," *Institute for Security Studies*. Available from: <https://issafrika.org/iss-today/kenyas-current-probe-on-terror-why-operation-usulama-watch-wont-cut-it>. Accessed on 27 12, 2019.
- Borum, R., (2011), "Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of conceptual models and empirical research." *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol 4, No 4, Pp. 37-62.
- Borum, R., (2012), "Radicalisation into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol 4, No 4, Pp. 7-36.
- Borum, R., (2015), "Assessing risk for terrorism involvement," *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, Vol 2, No 2, Pp.63-87.
- Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999), "Threat assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence," *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, 17, Pp. 323-337.
- Braddock, K., (2020), "Experimentation & Quasi Experimentation in Countering Violent Extremism: Directions of Future Inquiry," *Resolve network 2020*, <https://www.resolve.net.org/research/experimentation-quasi-experimentation-countering-violent-extremism-directions-future>, accessed 02 01, 2020.
- Briggs, R., (2010), "Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom," *International Affairs*, Vol 86, No. 4, Pp. 971-81.
- Chriss, J. J., (2007), "The functions of Social Bond," *Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications*, Vol 48, No 4. Pp. 689-712.
- Cook, A. N., Hart, S. D., Pressman, D. E., Strang, S., Lim, Y. L. (2015), "Threat assessment tools for the individual assessment of terrorism: A content evaluation of the MLG, VERA, and HCR-20V3." Poster presented to the annual conference of the Canadian Association of Threat Assessment Professionals, Lake Louise, AB. https://www.academia.edu/18897216/Threat_Assessment_Tools_for_the_Individual_Assessment_of_Terrorism_A_Content_Evaluation_of_the_MLG_VERA-2_and_HCR-20V3. Accessed 12 12, 2019.
- Counter Extremism Project, (2020), "Kenya and Counter Extremism," <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/somalia>, Accessed 20 01, 2020.
- Counter Extremism Project, (2020), "Somalia Extremism and Counter Extremism," <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/somalia>, Accessed 20 01, 2020.
- Davies R., (2013), "Planning evaluability assessments: A synthesis of the literature with recommendations." Working Paper 40. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/248656/wp40-planning-eval-assessments.pdf. Accessed 12 12, 2019.
- Dennen, J.M.G Van der,(2005), "Theories of Aggression," Groningen: Default Journal University of Groningen.
- Dina, A. R., (2013), "Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in Diaspora," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol, 6. No. 4. Pp. 67 – 91.
- Feddes, A. R., Liesbeth, A., Bertjan, D., (2015), "Increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity."

- Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol 45, No 7, Pp. 400 – 411.
- Freilich, J. D., & LaFree, G., (2016), "Special issue on measurement issues in the study of terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol 39, No (7-8), Pp. 569 – 579.
- Garrick, J., (2002), "Perspectives on the use of risk assessment to address terrorism," *Risk Analysis*, Vol 22, No 3, Pp. 421–423.
- Gielen Amy-Jane, (2017), "Countering Violent Extremism: A Realist Review for Assessing What Works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 31, No 6, Pp. 1149 – 1167.
- Gill, P., (2016), "Toward a scientific approach to identifying and understanding indicators of radicalization and terrorist intent: Eight key problems." *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, Vol 2, No (3–4), Pp. 187–191.
- Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P., (2014), "Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviours of lone-actor terrorists," *Journal of Forensic Science*, Vol 59, No 2, Pp. 425-435.
- Groholt M. J., (2018), "How Long Does Change Take? At Least 6 Months," *Psych Central*, <https://psychcentral.com/blog/how-long-does-it-take-at-least-6-months/>. Accessed 14 09, 2019.
- Grossman, S., Ungar, M., (2017), "Understanding Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism: A Standardised Research Measure." Melbourne: Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Australia. kin.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1374679/Understanding-Youth-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-the-BRAVE-14-Standardised-Measure.pdf. Retrieved 02 01, 2020.
- Guikema, S., (2012), "Modelling intelligent adversaries for terrorism risk assessment: Some necessary conditions for adversary models," *Pub-Med: Risk Analysis*, Vol 32, No 7, Pp.1117–1121.
- Harris-Hogan, S., Barrelle, K., & Zammit, A., (2015), "What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia," *Journal for Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, Vol 8, No 1, Pp. 6-24.
- He, C., Tianguang, M. (2005), "Bonding, bridging, and linking social capital and self-rated health among Chinese adults: Use of the anchoring vignettes technique." *PLoS One*, Vol 10 No. 15.
- Horgan, J., & Braddock, K., (2010), "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 22, No.2, Pp. 267–291.
- Horgan, J., (2008), "From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism." *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol 618, No 1, Pp. 80–94.
- Institute for Economic Peace, (2018), "Global Terrorism Index Reports," Available from: <http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/>, accessed on 27 12, 2019.
- Isiolo County, (2018), "Isiolo County Action Plan." (Unpublished)
- Jacobsen, M. (2010), "Learning counter-narrative lessons from cases of terrorist dropouts," in E. J. A. M. Kessels (Ed.), *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*. The Hague, Netherlands: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
- Kempf, K. L., (1993), "The Empirical Status in Hirschi Control Theory" in, Freda Adler and William S. Laufer, "New Directions in Criminological Theory," Vol. 4, *Advances in Criminological Theory*, edited by. New Bmnswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Klausen, J., Campion, S., Needle, N., Nguyen, G., & Libretti, R., (2015), "Toward a Behavioral Model of "Homegrown" Radicalisation Trajectories." *Studies in Conflict*

- and Terrorism, Vol 39, No 1, Pp. 67-83.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Köpetz, C., Bélanger, J. J., Chun, W. Y., Orehek, E., Fishbach, A., (2013), "Features of multifinality," *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, Vol 17, No 1, Pp. 22-39.
- Kundnani, A., (2012), "Radicalisation: The journey of a concept," *Sage Journals: Race & Class*, Vol 54, No 2, Pp. 3-25.
- Liht, J., & Savage, Sara., (2013), "Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British," *Journal of Strategic Security* Vol 6, No. 4. Pg. 44-66.
- Maalim, M., & Nyambura, S., (2018), "IGAD confronting violent extremism in East and Horn of Africa," *The East African*, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/Igad-confronting-violent-extremism-in-East-and-Horn-of-Africa--/434750-4304626-7edllnz/index.html>. Accessed 14 11, 2019.
- Magis, K., (2010), "Community resilience: An indicator of social sustainability." *Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal*, Vol 23, No 5, Pp. 401-416.
- Maikovich, A. K., (2005), "A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance Principles." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, Vol 35, No 4; Pp. 373-397.
- McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S., (2011), *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and US*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Meloy, J. R., & Gill, P., (2016), "The lone-actor terrorist and the TRAP-18," *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, Vol 3, No 1, Pp. 37-52.
- Meloy, J. R., & O'Toole, M. E., (2011), "The concept of leakage in threat assessment," *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, Vol 4, Pp. 513-527.
- Meloy, J. R., Hoffmann, J., Guldemann, A., & James, D., (2012), "The role of warning behaviours in threat assessment: An exploration and suggested typology," *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, Vol 30, No. 3, Pp.256-279.
- Meloy, J. R., Hoffmann, J., Roshdi, K., & Guldemann, A., (2014), "Some warning behaviours discriminate between school shooters and other students of concern," *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, Vol 1, No. 3, Pp. 203-211.
- Meloy, J. R., Mohandie, K., Knoll, J. L., & Hoffmann, J., (2015), "The concept of identification in threat assessment," *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, Vol 33, No 2-3, Pp. 213-237.
- Middleton, R, K., Anton, D, S., & Perri, G, M., (2016), "Long-Term Adherence to Health Behaviour Change," *AM J Lifestyle Med*, Vol 7, No 6, Pp. 395 – 404.
- Mignone, J., O'Neil, J. (2005), "Social capital and youth suicide risk factors in First Nations." *Canadian Journal of Public Health*, Vol 96(Supp. 1), Pp. 51-54.
- Moghaddam, M. F., (2009), "Deradicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism. In D. V. Canter," *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Pp. 277.
- Monahan, J. (2012), "The individual risk assessment of terrorism." *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, American Psychological Association*, Vol 18, No 2, Pp.167-205.
- Monahan, J., (1984), "The prediction of violent behaviour," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol 14, No 1, Pp.10-15.
- Monahan, J., (2011), "The individual risk assessment of terrorism," *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, No 2011 - 34, Pp.167-205.
- Monahan, J., (2015), "The individual risk assessment of terrorism: Recent developments. *Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series*, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665815. Accessed 10 11, 2019.

- Nan, L., (2002), *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Netherlands Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology. *The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment 2*. Available at: <https://www.vera-2r.nl/>, accessed on 27 12, 2019.
- Neumann, P. R., (2013), "The trouble with radicalisation," *International Affairs*, Vol 89, No 4, Pp. 873–893.
- Pressman, E. D. & J. Flockton, (2012), "Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremist and Terrorist: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment," *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Pp. 237-251.
- Pressman, E.D., (2012), "Calibrating risk for violent political extremists and terrorists: The VERA 2 structured assessment," *British Journal of Forensic Practice*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Pp. 237–251.
- Pynchon, M. R., & Borum, R., (1999), "Assessing threats of targeted group violence: Contributions from social psychology," *Behavioral Science Law*, Vol 17, No 3, Pp. 339-355.
- Ray Pawson and Nick Tilley, (1997), *Realistic Evaluation*. London: SAGE.
- Roberts, K., & Horgan, J., (2008), "Risk assessment and the terrorist. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 2, No 6, Pp. 3-9.
- Romaniuk P., (2015), "Does CVE work? Lessons learned from the global effort to counter violent extremism," *Global Centre on Cooperative Security*. Available at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf. Accessed 05 12, 2019.
- RTI International, (2017), "Countering Violent Extremism: The Use of Assessment Tools for Measuring Violence Risk: Literature Review" https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OPSR_TP_CVE-Use-Assessment-Tools-Measuring-Violence-Risk_Literature-Review_March2017-508.pdf, accessed 02 01, 2020.
- Sarma, K. M., (2017), "Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism." *American Psychologist*, Vol 72, No 3, Pp. 278–288.
- Schuurman, B., & Taylor, M., (2018), "Reconsidering Radicalization Fanaticism and the Link Between Ideas and Violence, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Pp. 3-22.
- Schuurman, B., (2018), "Research on Terrorism, 2007-2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship," *Terrorism and Political Violence*.
- Scofield Associates, (2018), "Gaps and Opportunities Report for Isiolo." Nairobi: Unpublished.
- Scurich, N., (2016), "An introduction to the assessment of violence risk." In J. P. Singh, S. Bjorkly, & S. Fazel (Eds.), *International Perspectives on Violence Risk Assessment*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Silber, M., & Bhatt, A., (2007), "Radicalization in the west: The hometown threat." New York: New York City Police Department, <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/20070816.NYPD.Radicalization.in.the.West.pdf>. Accessed 05, 11, 2019
- Smith, A., (2016), "What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us About Risk Factors and Indicators Associated with Radicalization to Violent Extremism in the United States." Unpublished manuscript, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC.
- Spalek, B., & Davies, L., (2012), "Mentoring in Relation to Violent Extremism: A Study of Role, Purpose, and Outcomes." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 35, No 4, Pp. 354-368.
- Stern, J., & Wiener, J. B., (2008), "Precaution against terrorism. In P. Bracken, I. Bremmer, & D. Gordon (Eds.), *Managing strategic surprise: Lessons from risk management and risk assessment*. Cambridge: CUP.

- Udén, L., (2002), "The changing face of methodological individualism." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 28, No 1, Pp. 479–507.
- UNDP, (2017), "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping point for Recruitment, UNDP New York, <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/>. Accessed 18 11, 2019.
- Van Metre, L., (2016), "Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya." Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Weine, S., (2012), "Building Resilience to Violent Extremism in Muslim Diaspora Communities in the United States," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide*, Vol 5, No. 1, Pp. 60–73.
- Williams, G., (2011), "A Decade of Australian Anti- Terror Laws." *Melbourne University Law Review*, Vol 35, 1136.
- Williams, M. J., Horgan J. Evans & William P., (2016), "Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program." U.S. Department of Justice. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=272096>, Accessed on 7 12, 2019.
- Wouter, P., (2012), "Community Resilience and Health: The Role of Bonding, Bridging and Linking Aspects of Social Capital," *Health & Place*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, Pp. 286-295.